University of Montana

ScholarWorks at University of Montana
Graduate Student Theses, Dissertations, &
Professional Papers

Graduate School

1975

Situational decision-making in public resource agencies
Dean Edward White
The University of Montana

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umt.edu/etd

Let us know how access to this document benefits you.
Recommended Citation
White, Dean Edward, "Situational decision-making in public resource agencies" (1975). Graduate Student
Theses, Dissertations, & Professional Papers. 3573.
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/etd/3573

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at ScholarWorks at University of
Montana. It has been accepted for inclusion in Graduate Student Theses, Dissertations, & Professional Papers by an
authorized administrator of ScholarWorks at University of Montana. For more information, please contact
scholarworks@mso.umt.edu.

Situational Decision-Making in Public Resource Agencies

By
Dean E. White
B.S., University of Montana, 1972
Presented in partial fulfillment of the
requirement for the degree of
Master of Forestry
UNIVERSITY OF MONTANA
1975

Approved by:

'7T. /\.

/o/x-j/rs

Chairman, Board of Examiners

F
Date

UMI Number: EP34463

All rights reserved
INFORMATION TO ALL USERS
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed,
a note will indicate the deletion.

UMT
inraBifwHDQn nuoRNingj

UMI EP34463
Published by ProQuest LLC (2012). Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author.
Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC.
All rights reserved. This work is protected against
unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code

ProQ^f
ProQuest LLC.
789 East Eisenhower Parkway
P.O. Box 1346
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346

<1^

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

iii

PREFACE

iv

CHAPTER 1

THE PARK SERVICE EXPERIMENT

1

CHAPTER 2

THE ADMINISTRATIVE POLICIES

5

CHAPTER 3

PRE-FORMED DECISIONS

10

CHAPTER 4

THE PUBLIC INTEREST

15

CHAPTER 5

RULES, REGULATIONS AND MANUALS

20

CHAPTER 6

SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTIONS. . .

27

BIBLIOGRAPHY

39

ii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I wish to express my gratitude to the members of my
committee; Professors William R. Pierce and R.W. Behan, from
the School of Forestry, and Professor Maureen F. Ullrich,
from the School of Business, at the University of Montana.
Also, my thanks to Professors Arnold W. Bolle and Richard E.
Shannon who replaced Professor R.W. Behan following his de
parture from the University of Montana. For the content of
Chapter 1, Mr. Thurman Trosper was of invaluable assistance
in providing me with details of the Park Service, for which
I am extremely grateful.

iii

PREFACE

As pressure for the use of our public lands increase,
the idea of what I will call particularized and situational
management of our public lands needs to be dealt with.

It

is my - contention that decision-making in our public resource
agencies at the on-the-ground managerial level is at best
faulty, and, in fact, is not decision-making at all.
before I go on, a definition is in order.

Perhaps

Each and every

resource decision that a manager faces confronts him with
unique problems economically, ecologically and politically.
These decisions, therefore, are unsolvable by books or manuals
which seem to be the mainstay of federal resource decision
making, and must be decided individually, particularly and
situationally.

Thus, the term particularized and situational

management.*
It is the now stated purpose of this paper to determine,
hopefully conclusively, whether or not more real decision
making powers are warranted for the on-the-ground manager in
our federal resource agencies.

In the light of what seems

to me the undisputable statement that resource managers face
*The term is not my own. The credit is due Prof. R.W. Behan
for his lectures which prompted this paper.
iv

iinique problems economically, ecologically and politically
with each decision that they attempt to make, I am perhaps
biased from the outset that particularized and situational
management is the answer to resource decision-making.

I am

not biased, however, in seeking here to prove or disprove
this assertion.
The National Park Service, in February, 1968, apparently
concerned with precisely the same problem with which I will
attempt to deal in this paper^ discontinued the use of its
manuals, guidelines, handbooks, etc., which until that time had
been the decision-maker's decision-maker.

They subsequently

replaced the manuals with three booklets.measuring in thick
ness and in total approximately one inch.

These booklets

described Park Service administrative policies, and left to
the manager the powers of decision-making within the realm
of these policies.

Gone were the times when a park ranger

faced with a problem could merely look in the manual for a
precise and unqualified answer.

He was virtually on his own

within the limitations of Park Service policies to deal with
the economical, ecological and political aspects of the
problem in a way which he calculated would best satisfy that
problem.

V

In the first two chapters, "The Park Service Experiment"
and the administrative policies which the Park Service pur
sued in order to give the on-the-ground decision-maker more
authority will be presented.

Hopefully, these will set the

stage for the ensuing chapters - discussions evolving around
topics which every public resource decision-maker must take
into account.

These facets of decision-making are: preformed

decisions, the public interest, and rules, regulations, and
manuals.
Realizing that there are other inputs which must nec
essarily precede many decisions, not the least of which is
consideration of the resource itself, I have been selective
and have singled out the above mentioned three.

This was

done not to detract from the importance of other consider
ations in decision-making, but because I feel these are points,
the resolution of which separates a resource technician from
a resource decision-maker.

Granted, a resource decision

maker must have a thorough knowledge of the resource(s) with
which he is dealing, this is taken as a given premise in
this paper.
This paper was originally intended for and about federal
resource agencies, but has application for all formal organizations

vi

Chapter 1
THE PARK SERVICE EXPERIMENT*
In February of 1968, a decision was made by the then
Director of the National Park Service, to eliminate that
13
agency's manuals.

The director stated that this drastic

action was needed because the "manuals were becoming a sub
stitute for the park superintendents - the regional directors,
to exercise judgment."

26

Further, that there was too much

dependence on the manuals, and that decision-makers were
"hiding behind" the manuals to protect their positions.

In

place of the discarded manuals, the director substituted
three small and vaguely worded administrative policy book
lets which will be discussed in detail in the following chapter.
These administrative policy booklets provided little
guidance to a decision-maker in terms of specific duties,
and, therefore, the quick break from the manuals, which were
quite specific, was a complete and abrupt change.

Along with

the manual elimination, the agencies' authority delegation,
work standards, and goals and objectives of the Service itself
*I am indebted to Mr. Thurman Trosper for much of what appears
in this chapter. Mr. Trosper was employed in the Washington
office of the National Park Service while these procedures
were taking place.
1

2
were eliminated.

Somewhat of a "reign of terror" presided

in the Service, as the professional managers and decision
makers, not knowing what their authority to make decisions
was, simply did not make any decisions, and passed responsi
bility ultimately to the director.

A fear of retaliation

settled over the Service, that when you made a mistake, you
were out.

This situation became almost intolerable for honest,

committed professionals, for they never knew when they might
be reorganized out of a career for making some "wrong"
decision.
These actions by the director resulted in his running a
"one-man band" so to speak.

In all likelihood this was an

objective of the director to begin with.

Professional

managers were forced to mirror the director's wishes, and if
they made a "wrong" decision in his estimation, he had a
technique, this was to reorganize.

26

These continual

"reorganizations every three to six months", plus the other
previously described actions put the Service into a constant
state of confusion and chaos.

Nobody knew what they were to

do or what anyone else was doing.

Wanting to protect their

careers, the decision-makers in the Service bucked decisions
up the line, ultimately to the director.

This whole campaign

turned into a management technique on the part of the director.

3
He, and only he, decided on matters of any significance.
His weapon in this climb to autocracy was reorganization.
If managers and decision-makers made "wrong" decisions, or
if the director's wishes were not included in the decision
process, they were "reorganized out" of positions of responsi
bility.

It all turned into quite a complicated contradiction.

First, the manuals, rules and regulations were eliminated,
ostensibly to give managers a freer hand in decision-making.
This done, the director saw to it that any decisions of sig
nificance were either made by him or had his approval.
was a subtle form of coercion.

It

Thus, through these actions,

the on-the-ground decision-maker in actuality was exercising
less judgment now than he did before the manuals were eliminated.
This was, in my opinion, not a direct result of the elimination
of the manuals, but of the director's management technique.
He was "not an administrator - he could not delegate," and,
26

therefore, the "experiment" was doomed from the outset.

For, whether by accident or design, the director took on the
job of decision-making for the entire Service.

The task was

enormous, involving 284 different areas, nearly 30,000,000
acres and an annual budget of $300 million. (Approximate
13
1972 figures)
Due to the constant reorganizations and
the elimination of the manuals, without replacing them with

4
any standards, goals and objectives, or delegations of auth
ority, the director had destroyed open coiranunications and
moved everyone to protecting their own interests.

Even to

day, as far as administration is concerned, the Park Service
26
is a "place of chaos".
To have made the "experiment" work, standards, goals,
and delegations of authority would had to have been set
up.

To some extent work standards were outlined in the

administrative policy booklets offering guidelines to the
decision-maker, but goals and delegations of authority were
noticeably lacking.

Without goals, the managers, by defini

tion, had nothing to aim for in their activities with the
exception of preserving their careers.

Along with this, is

the fact that there was no delegation of authority.

This

is, I think, the key to decentralization of organizations to let the on-ground manager know where and how far in which
he can operate, and let him go.^^

The director realized this too late.

A crash project

was implemented to determine the above, but the director was
fired before they could be implemented, and the new director
did not utilize the findings.

What the decision-makers had

to assist them in their duties is the subject of the next
chapter.

Chapter 2
THE ADMINISTRATIVE POLICIES
The Administrative Policy booklets, of which I have
previously written, are surely a study in governmental
brevity.

The booklets of which there are three, (one each

for natural areas, historical areas, and recreational areas
of the National Park System), measure a scant 5 11/16 inches
by 9 2/16 inches, with an average thickness of approximately
5/16 of an inch.
repetitious.

Also, a major portion of the booklets are

I mention this not to detract from the book

let's contents, but for a comparison to the manuals of most
large government agencies consisting of ream upon ream of
bureaucratic exactness, that if not specifically designed
to strip a resource manager of his innovative and resourceful
qualities, do so inadvertently.

This is not so with the Park

Service booklets.
The Park Service booklets are at once all-encompassing,
yet leave much to the discretion, innovation and resource
fulness of the professional managers in the Service.

As an

example, the booklet for natural areas covers 116 topics
from advertising through religious services, to wildlife
population.

To illustrate, two topics from the natural

5
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areas booklet are included in their entirety below.

Wildlife Populations
Wildlife populations will be controlled
when necessary to maintain the health
of the species, the native environment,
and the scenic landscape, and to safe
guard public health and safety. Ungu
late populations will be maintained at
the level that the range will carry in
good health and without impairment to
the soil, the vegetation, or to habitats
of the several species in an area.
Signs
Roadside signing, whether regulatory,
infoinmational, or interpretive is an
integral part of the visitor experience,
as well as road design. Care should
be exercised to insure that the quality
and design of all signing enhance the
visitor experience.29
The exactness is gone from these guidelines, and decision
makers are left to determine what decision is best for the
area ecologically, feasible economically, and desirable
politically for the user public.

The manager is virtually

unrestrained in using his judgment and resourcefulness.

And

that is as it should be; for what else is a manager for?
Surely no professional is needed to follow the strict and
virtually unwaivering rules contained in, for example, the
Forest Service Manual.

28

Manuals should be no more than guidelines for decision-

7
makers.

They cannot be a step by step progression of how to

handle every conceivable situation if the organization is to
improve and change in the face of changing values and knowledge.
For, "Manuals are only a repository of history,"

26

and we

cannot look at history to solve all our problems or as a
basis for all our decisions.
would never be made.

If that were true, progress

Managers must be given a chance to use

discretion in decisions affecting the vastly different
ecologies, economies and publics encountered in our large
resource agencies.
These Administrative Policy booklets do just that.
They are virtually all-encompassing, yet let individual
managers decide what is best for his particular situation.
Situational management can be a reality within the confines
of these booklets and professional managers have the oppor
tunity to utilize their skills in making decisions affecting
their area of responsibility.

These booklets could easily

serve as a model for our resource agencies and other organ
izations where common goals and objectives are present, but
where restrictive manuals stifle the resourcefulness of
professional managers and decision-makers.

However, as we have seen in the previous chapter, the
"Park Service experiment" did not work even though Park

8
Service personnel had these booklets at their disposal.
Can this be called a failure for the concept of situational
management?

In view of the other things that took place

during the period, I think not.

For besides the complete

elimination of the detailed manual system; delegation of
authority, work standards, filing systems and even mail rout
ing channels were destroyed.
all "habits", good and bad.

This drastic action destroyed
Further, "one 'bad* decision"

and managers were "in trouble" with the director.

No goals

were outlined, and the director, through his use of constant
reorganizations, held Park Service personnel in fear of losing
26

their careers.

In short. Park Service managers didn't man

age or make decisions at all.

"Nobody knew what they were to
26

do or what anyone else was doing."

Park Service personnel

were given the opportunity (through the Administrative Policy
booklets) to exercise their judgment and discretion, but this
then was neutralized by the extenuating circumstances described
above.

In view of this fact, no system of guidelines or

manuals could conceivably have worked.

Park Service managers

one day enjoying the complete security of detailed and
exacting manuals were without any security whatsoever the
next.

This though, instead of being the fault of the policy

booklets, was the fault of the director's "management technique"
and of his not having the foresight to realize that authority

9
delegation, goals, and the other points described above were
essential for effectiveness in the Service.

chapter 3
PRE-FORMED DECISIONS
Herbert Kaufman, in his book The Forest Ranger, has
made popular a term that I find most fitting for my purpose
here, this being "Pre-formed Decisions", which Kaufman defines
thusly:
...events and conditions in the field
are anticipated as fully as possible,
and courses of action to be taken for
designated categories of such events
and conditions are described. The
field officers then need determine
only into what category a particular
circumstance falls; once this deter
mination is made, he then simply follows
the series of steps applicable to that
category. Within each category, there
fore, the decisions are "preformed."15
The idea behind preformed decisions is not new; it has been
employed since man discovered organization.

More bluntly,

preformed decisions are simply rules and regulations handed
down from superiors to their subordinates in the decision
making realm.

The point of the matter though, is whether

the man closest to the decision is really a decision-maker;
whether or not he really makes a decision considering the
economic, ecological and political circumstances of the par
ticular situation which he faces.
10

The manual is there and

11
according to Kaufman, it is to the field officer's consider
able advantage to categorize the problem in terms of the
manual and to follow its dictates.

Doing this by no means

requires a decision-maker, for "Any warm, ambitious, and
reasonably erect 'ticket puncher' can please his superiors
by routinely and dogmatically applying the preformed decisions
3
contained in the Forest Servxce Manual..."
I do not wish to single out the Forest Service here,
for it is undoubtedly true that many organizations employ
manuals and preformed decisions with as much or more vigor.
However, I am more knowledgeable concerning Forest Service
procedures; therefore, I have chosen this organization as a
frame of reference in this regard.
Perhaps at the crux of the matter are the concepts of
centralization and decentralization.

The Forest Service has

maintained from its inception to the present that it is a
highly decentralized organization leaving management de
cisions to its field officers (district rangers).

Indeed,

"The Forest Service has made decentralization its cardinal
principal of organization structure, the heart and core of
its 'administrative philosophy'.

The ideal (of decentral

ization) has been affirmed and reaffirmed, over and over
again, for every generation of foresters.

It is now part

12
of the dogma of the agency."

15

But, is the Forest Service or

for that matter, is any organization with the type of elaborate
preformed decisions aptly described in The Forest Ranger
really decentralized?
really make decisions?

That is, does the field officer
For, "a result of governing by rules

is centralization in decision-making."12

Kaufman suggests

that tests whereby a group of rangers without all the usual
preformed decisions encumbering them, be set up.

Procedures

such as l\imp-s\im allocations, abandonment of diaries and the
manual, and less frequent inspections could be employed.
Then,
If experimentation discloses that
field behavior can be controlled as
effectively by inculcating the fact
and value premises of central head
quarters upon the minds of the field
men without extensive use of close
supervisory and enforcement procedures,
as is possible with these devices,
then an organization which gives
every indication of decentralization
by all the usual indicies (supervision,
reference of matters to higher head
quarters, the niamber and specificity
of regulations under which field
officers work, the provision of
appeal from the decision of field
agents, the decisions made by field
men and the variety of duties performed)
may in fact be as fully governed from
the center as one without these visible
paraphernalia of central direction.
Such an experiment would undoubtedly prove very useful, but

13

since such an experiment is as yet forthcoming, a reliance
on past and present investigators is mandatory.
Concerning decentralization and decision-making,
Bernard H. Ba\am, in his book Decentralization of Authority
in a Bureaucracy, has written, "The substantive essence of
the process of administrative decentralization is decision
making."^

And it must be, for what else in an organization

is there to decentralize?

Surely, the prefoonned decisions

described by Kaufman do not constitute decision-making
authority, and, thus, do not constitute a decentralized
organization.
From free-use permits to huge sales
of timber, from burning permits to
fighting large fires, from requis
itioning office supplies to maintaining
discipline, classes of situations and
patterns of response are detailed in
the Manual. Every action is guided.
This is not decentralization, but is a highly centralized
organization, whereby line officers are virtually required
to mirror the decisions already made for them.
At the risk of deviating from my goal, I have presented
the above discourse on decentralization to try to illustrate
the complicity of the terms decentralization and decision
making.

For decision-making at the lower hierarchical

14
levels presupposes a decentralized organization - decen
tralization, in fact, not only in word.

Of course, it is

true that different goals might be attached to different
districts or units and these must be defined, but then, the
on-the-ground decision-maker must be given the authority to
exercise his discretion within these definitions.

Hopefully

then, I have made the case that decentralization and decision
making go hand in hand.

If then the premise is accepted that

decentralization is the distribution through delegation of
decision-making authority, we can now proceed to another
aspect of decision-making in federal resource agencies.

Chapter 4

THE PUBLIC INTEREST
The public interest is an old often used term with
respect to decision-making, especially in the federal agencies.
And quite naturally so, for the federal agencies are in
business to serve the public interest.
stitutes the public interest?
public interest lies?

However, what con

Who is to judge where the

What the public wants?

These are

some of the questions which I address in this chapter.
"Anything so inchoate and diverse as the large broad
19
concept of the Public cannot really exist."

This quote,

from Walter Lippmann's The Phantom Public circa 1925, is, I
think, as true today as it was then.

Yet federal agencies

go on blindly "determining" the singular public interest and
setting agency policy accordingly.

In support of this, I

offer the following statements from A University View Of
The Forest Service regarding the recent turmoil over man
agement of the Bitterroot National Forest: "Over the past
few years management decisions and policies have frequently
resulted in situations that have disappointed virtually all
the publics that make use of the Bitterroot National Forest.
This situation results, ....because of policies laid down
15

16
in Washington...."

27

The policies laid down in this case

were, in fact, that The Public Interest was a singular in~
terest for timber production at any cost, regardless of
other expressed public interests.

But is there really a

single definable public interest?

Can a Washington official

of some agency really know how best to serve the public
interest; and, knowing that, set policy and preformed decisions
for his subordinates who themselves are dealing with the
public?

I think not, and, as Charles Reich in a paper

Bureaucracy And The Forests puts it, "... the Service rec
ognizes ... that its ultimate job is nothing less than the
definition of 'the public good,' a task once reserved for
philosopher-kings."

24

If we are committed to some singular

public interest, then we are also committed to finding that
singular public interest.

This in reality is an impossibility,

for the "silent majority" is, in fact, silent, and "... no
one really knows where 'the public interest' really lies."

2

"The task of government [and, therefore, of public admin
istration in the United States] ... is not to express an
imaginary popular will, but to effect adjustment among the
various special wills and purposes."

16

The silent majority is either apathetic, acquiescent,
or ignorant, and the public interest is served in any given

17
issue by anything that conflicting groups can agree upon.

2

This would seem a much more realistic and rational approach
to a definition of the public interest.

But, lest I stray

too far from situational and particularized decision-making,
I will proceed to make my point with the understanding that
the broad public interest is, in fact, undemonstrable, "
whereas, the situation of conflicting groups voicing their
interest is a public reality.
What we are really talking about is the "sum-of-theminorities" concept of the public interest.

This is that

for any given issue the consensus is the majority of the
vocal.

Again, borrowing from Professor Behan, an illustration
O
might look thus:^

Consensus
(Majority of the Vocal)

Vocal Minority
(Two or more active
minorities)

Silent majority
(consenting via
acquiescence, apathy
or ignorance)

Thus, "through the medium of acquiescence, apathy or
ignorance, the silent majority consents to the choices of

18
the active minority." 2

This view, that the STom-of-the-minorities more accurately
reflects public interest is held true by many political
.
^
scientists.

4,6,11,16,18,19,30

_
•
I, .
The question then is who is

to determine what the svim-of-the-minorities view is?

It must be

the on-the-ground manager in closest proximity with the public
minority groups, dealing with these groups situationally and
particularly as problems arise.

"Bureaucratic professionals

simply have to respond to the public as it is, not as they
hope it would be."
Government agencies often equate public interest with
the long term public benefit.
benefit?

But what of short term public

Do we not have public interest in the short run?

"About the only thing we can be fairly sure of from a study
of history, barring the possibility of nuclear wars is that
future generations will be wealthier than we are.

Deliberate

redistribution [of resources] in favor of the future may
well involve a transfer of wealth from a poorer to a richer
group."

22

We must provide for our children before we worry

about providing for our children's children.

Public interest

in the short run is real and cannot be defined as the long
term public benefit.

19
The short term is now and must be decided by the s\amof-the-minorities concept of public interest, which in turn
must be decided by the situational decision-maker coping with
the various publics in whatever capacity he may be in a situ
ation to handle.

The public interest cannot be passed down

from agency heads in the form of policy guidelines and pre
formed decisions for the resource manager.

For there is no

singular public interest and the on-the-ground situational
decision-maker is the key to determining public interest in
a given situation.

Chapter 5

RULES, REGULATIONS AND MANUALS
5
"Detailed rules prevent adaptation to changing situations."
This seemingly quite obvious statement describes perfectly
the gist of this chapter.

That is, a decision-maker working

under detailed rules, regulations and preformed decisions
cannot adapt to changing peculiarities and situations which
occur in his realm, and that really, he is not a decision
maker at all if bound to work under such conditions.

But

this is precisely how many of our federal agencies operate.
Again, using the Forest Service as an example, and citing
Kaufman's The Forest Ranger "By issuing authorizations,
directions and prohibitions, it is therefore possible to
influence the behavior of organizations.

An extensive

elaborate network of such issuances envelopes every district
Ranger."^5

These systems of rules, regulations and preformed

decisions are, I believe, unjustifiable in view of the fact
that first, the resources are situationally diverse and com
plex, and, second, that the needs and desires of the public
(public interests) are situationally diverse and complex.
These situationally diverse and complex problems can be handled

20

21
only by a situational decision-maker in closest contact with
the resource and the public.

The on-the-ground situational

manager has a better feeling for what might occur as a re
sult of the action which he takes.

For it is impossible for

an agency head policy-maker to know the particular public
interest and the implications of resource decisions in the
vast array of problems arising concerning resource decisions
nationwide.

And then to be able to put down in writing the

action to be taken to best serve the nation's resources as
well as the public interest is preposterous I

For "No system

of rules and supervision can be so finely spun that it anticipates all exigencies that might arise."

5

If this were so,

there would be no need for professional on-the-ground land
managers; "manual trained" technicians could do the job nicely.
Charles E. Lindblom, in a paper. The Science of 'Muddling
Through', though speaking of policy-making has expressed
some views that are, I think, applicable here.

He talks of

incremental policy-making in a way which we could interpret
18
here as incremental decision-making.

Incremental policy

making is just that, adjusting policy at the margin to
accommodate shifting values, interests, and in our case,
resource problems.

Our situational decision-maker can be

thought of in the same light, whereby he can make his

22
decisions relying on past, similar situations, adjusting
decisions incrementally as each unique situation warrants.
No one is in a better position to deal with the particular
decision and to know whether the outcome will be preferred
politically (public interest), rational economically and
justified ecologically than the on-the-ground situational
decision-maker.

Not only is the on-the-ground situational decision
maker in a better position to handle his particular resource
and public (s), but, the agency further suffers in this
setting of prescribed rules, regulations and preformed
decisions, because the initiative and innovation of the
manager is unable to flourish.

"Rules set limits hot only

on what men do but also on what men think.
against future proposals." 14

... the bulwark

And, "if we devise too elabo

rate a system of checks and balances, [rules and preformed
decisions], it will only be a matter of time before the
self-reliance and initiative of our managers will be des
troyed..."^

It would seem, Ceven putting aside for the

moment the detrimental effects on agencies and their managers)
with all the schooling, screening, and on-the-job training
that resource managers must adhere to in this day, that
agencies would learn to trust more in the good judgment, hon

23
esty, integrity and credibility of its on-the-ground managers.
Admittedly, in most, if not all resource agencies, the on-theground manager is usually on the bottom rung of the career
ladder, a deplorable situation.

If, as I have noted, that

resource decisions cannot be made at the top and handed down
to the on-the-ground manager; and if it is this manager that
must make the basic decisions, then he carries considerable
responsibility and should be in a position in the line
structure commensurate with this responsibility.

The so-

called "Bolle Report" considering Forest Service practices
found likewise; "We find the bureaucratic line structure as
it operates, archaic, undesirable and subject to change.

The

manager on the ground should be much nearer the top of the
career ladder."

27

But rules are seemingly synonymous with organizations
even though rules might be harming the functioning of the
organization.

R.K. Merton has aptly described this process:

... top management(s) attempt[s] to
obtain control over the behavior of
the members of organizations as the
organization grows larger and more
complex. Standard operating procedures
are instituted and emphasized, while
control consists largely in checking
to insure that procedures are followed.
The consequences are: Ca) Relationships
become less personalized and are more
prescribed by the position people
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hold. Evaluation and reward become
less closely tied to individual
achievement. (b) The rules of the
organization become internalized and
adherence to rules becomes valued
even when it no longer results in the
outcome for which the rule was origin
ated. (c) Finally, decision-making
evolves into a process of sorting
questions that arise into a restricted
niomber of categories and applying the
rule connected with the formally
applicable category rather than
searching for alternatives. As a
result, behavior becomes increasingly
rigid and defensible. Behavior also
becomes less responsive to customer
or client needs and more responsive
to internal organization standards.
As trouble with outside parties arise,
individuals feel an even stronger need
to be able to defend their actions and
so place an even higher premium on
following prescribed rules. Manage
ments' efforts to prescribe behavior
[to assure the customer's or client's
needs are served] actually results in
the loss of the organizations power
to serve their needs. As a consequence,
management feels an even greater need
for control and issues new rules and
procedures, etc. Thus management
efforts to control not only have dys
functional unintended consequences,
but also a tendency to perpetuate the
consequences.21
That, in a rather large nutshell, explains better than I
the effects and consequences of extensive rules and
preformed decisions on not only decision-makers in large
organizations, but on the organizations themselves, and
their clients.
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It is, I believe, precisely this chain of rule oriented
events that has led our federal resource agencies into the
troubles that confront them today.

For, "A rule run organization

is easily surprised by the unexpected.And unexpected
they were, for the onslaught of opposition against agency
practices of recent years, (particularly opposition to
even-aged forest management practices & clearcutting),
an onslaught with which managers were unable to deal due
to the rigidly defined rules, regulations and preformed
decisions which undoubtedly were followed, and which also
undoubtedly were the reasons for the agencies' inability to
cope.

Public interest(s), resource values and ecolo

gical constraints are ever changing entities, and rules
cannot change fast enough to allow for these changes.

Again,

Herbert Kaufman has captured this idea stating that, "Most
[appeal] cases arise not because Rangers fail to adhere to
the preformed decisions of the Forest Service, but because
they do confoinn."

15

This then, that managers cannot react

to changing conditions precisely because of preformed
decisions curtailing their initiative and innovation, is
the essence of my case.

"Decisions affecting the multiple

uses of forest land [or any public resource] cannot be made
by standard formulas or rules learned by rote.

The forester
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[or any public resource manager] must work in uncertainty
and controversy."

O1

Chapter 6
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTIONS
SUMMARY
In this paper, I have attempted to demonstrate that
situational management is the key to managing federal re
source agencies in a manner that is justifiable ecologically,
feasible economically, and acceptable politically.

To do

this, I have sought to show what a professional manager must
do, and how best he can accomplish his ends.

I have frequently

used logic though in most cases this logic has been substan
tiated by other investigators.

A summation of my studies

follow.
Chapters 1 and 2 dealt with what I have called the
"Park Service Experiment", and, therefore, they will be
combined here.

The Park Service, by eliminating its

manuals, presented a unique opportunity to employ a system
of situational management as I have portrayed in this paper.
The director of the Service had determined that the manuals
were becoming a substitute for decision-making, and that
managers were using the manuals in lieu of professional
judgment to protect their positions.

The manuals were being
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used as the authority instead of as guidelines.

27

Because
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of this, the manuals were eliminated and the Administrative
Policy booklets were substituted in their place.

I'll not

delve into those again, as I have already noted their potential
worth.

However, the experiment seemingly did not work, and as

such, would seem contrary to my previous writing concerning
situational management.

Again, however, as I have also pre

viously noted, there were some drastic, extenuating circumstances
which I believe contributed to the experiment's downfall.
They are as follows;
(1)

Goals and objectives went undefined,
leaving employees without direction.

(2)

Work standards were not set up, thus
job performance could not be guaged.

(3)

The director's management technique
of reorganizing whenever decisions
were made without his knowledge and
approval.

The last of these circumstances was probably the most fatal.
Men naturally feared for their careers as a result of the
director's techniques, and, thus, deferred decisions to him.
Situational management was by no sense of the term taking
place, and, thus, did not get a fair trial.
In Chapter 3, the concepts of preformed decisions and
organizational decentralization were discussed.
concepts basically are at extreme opposites.

The ty/o

Decentral
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ization, is the distribution through delegation, of decision
making authority, whereas, preformed decisions are the
distribution of decisions to the "decision-maker."

I have

argued that preformed decisions are unjustifiable in view of
the situationally diverse and complex problems facing on-theFurther, that decentralization, in fact,

ground managers.

giving managers true discretion within the confines of their
authority is essential for managing public resource agencies.
Chapter 4, brought up the age-old controversy of public
interest.

Who is to decide what the public interest is in a

given issue?

Here, I presented, with the support of many

others, the case that "... the public interest in any given
issue is served by anything that two conflicting minorities
can agree upon."

2

The situational manager is in the best

position to arbitrate the public interest in decisions which
he must carry out.

Some vague concept of public interest

whereby agency heads "decide" the public interest of the
I

silent majority is intangible and unrealistic, and, "...
through the medium of acquiescence, apathy, or ignorance,
the silent majority consents to the choices of the active
minority."

2

Therefore, active minorities will voice their

opinions and express their wishes to a situational manager
who is in the best position to weigh the differing public
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interests and to harmonize them with the other ecological
and economical constraints.

"The task of government ... is

not to express an imaginary popular will, but to effect
adjustment among the various special wills and purposes ..."^
The situational manager can best affect this adjustment
since the active minorities will voice their various special
wills and purposes to him.
Chapter 5 , is similar to Chapter 3, in that rules and
prefoiTtied decisions are very similar.

Detailed rules handed

down from agency heads deprive a manager of using his skills
and resourcefulness in making decisions that are necessarily
unique to his area of responsibility.

Charles E. Lindblom,

writing on the subject states that, "The attempt to push
categorization as far as possible and to find general
propositions which can be applied to specific situations
is what I refer to with the word 'theory'."

18

Not only this,

but detailed rules and regulations prevent a manager from
adapting to changing peculiarities and situations which
occur, besides undermining the self-reliance and initiative
of decision-makers.
CONCLUSIONS
TO say that situational management would have been
successful had the previously mentioned deficiencies in
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the Park Service experiment been removed, would be con
jecture at this point.

However, on the basis of my studies

the odds are in its favor.
Concerning manuals, rules, regulations and pre-formed
decisions, there are good reasons for them, not the least
of which involves repetitive type work.

There is good

reason to commit to writing this type of work as far as
time saving in job performance and in the training of new
employees is concerned.

There is a fine line between that

of no manuals creating problems of no direction, and that
of too extensive a manual system creating a shelter and
stifling initiative for employees.

"The problem is one of

all of [the] professionals in an organization of recogniz
ing - of being able to delineate and define what things have
to be handled by the manager as breaking new ground, and
what things can be handled in the tradition - under the old
system."
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The point of this paper is that this judgment

should be left up to the situational manager, and not pre
scribed for him in the form of preformed decisions.

For he

is in the best position to know all the unique circumstances
surrounding a decision and, likewise, he should have the
opportunity to break new ground when the situation warrants.
The on-the-ground situational manager has a better feeling
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for what might occur as a result of his action.
There are essentially three things which a professional
public resource manager must look to when evaluating a
decision.

They are;

the resource, the public, and economics.

In the light of this, he is then the best qualified to make
decisions concerning his area of responsibility.

He is

trained in the knowledge of the resource and should know
the peculiarities of that resource in his area better than
others.

The particular public(s) interest in the decision

will make their opinions known to him, while economically,
the manager, through agency budgets, congressional appro
priations, etc., knows what he can and cannot do in this
regard.

Who then is better qualified?

I have presented my case and find that a situational
manager must be the answer.

Though this paper is by no

means definitive, I think it has shed some light and though
the conclusions may be inexact, they are inescapable in view
of my studies.

SUGGESTIONS
As I have stated, this study is neither definitive nor
conclusive, so perhaps a suggestion or two would be in order.
An elaborate system of rules, regulations, pre-formed
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decisions and the public resource agencies penchant for
determining the public interest has been, I think, disproven in previous chapters as the best means of decision
making at the ground level.

We've found also, however,

that the Park Service's rather radical attempt to change
this system ended in a qualified failure.

Qualified because

at least it showed that people were aware and thinking about
the problem, even though their solutions were perhaps too
much-too fast.
There is a place in organizations where manuals, rules,
regulations and pre-formed decisions fit in and also, of
course, since public resource agencies are set up to serve
the public, the public interest must be served.

I have

argued, however, that the on-the-ground manager is in the best
position to know what that public interest is in his area
of responsibility, and that rules and regulations, etc.,
should not stifle a professional on-the-ground manager's
initiative and resourcefulness.

While it is probably true that organizations and agencies
do not make rules, regulations, etc., specifically to stifle
their managers, it seems that this is the case as Kaufman repeatedly points out in regard to the Forest Service.

15

And, as Bernard Baum has pointed out, "if we devise too
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elaborate a system of checks and balances, [rules and pre
formed decisions], it will only be a matter of time before
the self-reliance and initiative of our managers will be
destroyed
But organizations and bureaucratic agencies change
ever so slowly, and a trend toward giving on-the-ground
managers greater responsibility in real decision making
authority is not going to come about simply because reports,
papers, theses, etc., advocate such a change.

Change will,

I think, have to come from the bottom, from the on-the-ground
managers working now in the field.

Top rung organizational

officials will have to be shown that decisions for and about
the resource and the particular publics at the ground level,
can and should be made by the ground level professional.

Much of what follows, what I consider alternatives and
a means of attaining the above, is taken or has evolved
from a book by Neil Postman and Charles Weingartner,
The Soft Revolution.
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In it, the authors describe ways

to work within the system to achieve goals virtually un
attainable from without.
Following then are some thoughts to consider which
could turn the agency around - giving more real decision-
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making authority to on-the-ground managers:
1)

"Render unto Caesar that which is Caesar's," and go about your business.

For a start, this

will provide the manager with a means to do
things his own way, while still supplying the
agency with its "fuel" for self-preservation.
In other words, don't break the rules and pre
formed decisions of the agency, simply bend them
to fit you and your client's particular needs.
Don't infuriate or frighten people.

Give them

their reports, follow their directives, then go
about the business of providing the best pro
fessional help possible.

As I said, this is

only a start and will not cause any significant
change.

It will merely give the professional

manager the means to maintain his professional
integrity, while also supplying the agency with
its supposed needs.

In other words, don't sac

rifice professional integrity for bureaucratic
exactness.
2)

When attempting to make a change, first ask why
some procedure used is good for the clientele the Service?

Do not give the impression that
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your ideas are more virtuous, just that you may
have a better idea to attain the virtuous goals.
For example, all public resource managers would
agree, I hope, that the public deserves the best
possible ecological and economical resource man
agement available.

Do not question that pre

formed decisions and rules and regulations do
not attempt to achieve this, but merely that
as a trained professional resource manager in
closest contact with the public, you are
in the position to make decisions the conse
quences of which cannot readily be known by
whoever wrote the pre-formed decision and caused
it to be placed in the agency manual.
3)

Virtually all agencies and bureaucracies have
solemn beliefs that, (it is assumed), bind the
organization together.

In the Forest Service

multiple-use management is emphasized "(with
apparent unawareness of its obscurity)" as is
the idea "... that the national forests must be
managed for the greatest good of the greatest
number in the long run (again, with no evident
15
recognition of this slogan's ambiguities)."
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A more general and far reaching solemn belief
is that resource agencies function better with
not only central direction, but central decision
making as well.

It is the job of the resource

manager desiring change in this regard, to make
visible the ridiculousness of solemn beliefs.
Suggest alternative procedures - seriously, not
solemnly, and have solutions to problems that
you might bring up because administrators are
always full up with problems.

The solutions

that you suggest might be tried simply because
no one else has the time, the energy or the
inclination to figure out anything better.
Don't simply suggest that some procedure is
wrong, but have viable solutions at the ready.
4)

As institutions grow, (and this is especially
true of governmental bureaucracies) the purposes
of the institution are overshadowed by its earnest
desire for self-preservation.
way with institutions.

For, "that is the

Their forms, including
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their rhetoric, always survive their functions."
Many pre-formed decisions, rules and regulations,
etc., are exactly for this purpose, that is self-
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preservation of the institution.

Recognize

these for what they are, and again "Render unto
Caesar that which is Caesar's" - and go about
your business.
5)

"A major characteristic of the American culture
is that it is pluralistic.

If pluralism means

anything, it means the availability of options.
Where there are no real options, you have a
fraudulent pluralism ..."
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Pre-formed decisions

leave the on-the-ground resource manager in many
cases, without options.

A manager or decision

maker without options is nothing more than a
figurehead.

This is a useful point to use when

opting for change.
The above suggestions are offered not perhaps as alter
natives, but as a means by which on-the-ground decision
makers might work within agencies to effect changes that
my studies and experience have shown are needed.
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